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The international welfare e®ects of a country's monetary policy shocks have been controversial
in the new open economy macro (i.e., NOEM) literature. While a unilateral monetary expansion
increases the production e±ciency in each country, it a®ects the terms of trade in favor of one
country against another depending on the currencies of price setting. In this paper, we incorporate
multiple stages of production and trade into a standard NEOM model to capture world production
interdependence, and show that increased world production interdependence tends to magnify
the e±ciency-improvement e®ect while dampening the terms-of-trade e®ect. As a consequence, a
unilateral monetary expansion can be mutually bene¯cial regardless of in which currency prices
are set. In this sense, international monetary policy transmission may not be a source of potential
con°ict in a world with production interdependence.
JEL classi¯cation: E32, F31, F41
Key Words: Stages of processing; Monopolistic competition; Local currency pricing; Welfare
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How a country's monetary policy surprises a®ect its own and trading partners' wellbeing has
been controversial in the new open-economy macroeconomics literature that features monopo-
listic competition and nominal rigidities. While a unilateral monetary expansion helps alleviate
monopolistic distortions so as to raise output to a more e±cient level in each country, it also
a®ects terms of trade in favor of one country and against another depending on the currencies
of price setting. If prices are set in sellers' currency unit, then a unilateral monetary expansion
weakens the source country's terms of trade, the e®ect of which may counteract the e±ciency
improvement e®ect, and may thus reduce the source country's welfare. On the other hand, if
prices are set in buyers' currency unit, a country's monetary expansion improves its own terms of
trade at the cost of its trading partners, so that the policy tends to have a \beggar-thy-neighbor"
e®ect. Since in reality both sellers' and buyers' local currency pricing behaviors are present, any
policy recommendations emanating from this literature must be highly quali¯ed.
The current paper proposes to resolve the welfare controversy by allowing countries to trade
not only ¯nished consumption goods but also intermediate goods at various stages of processing.
We show that increased world production interdependence magni¯es the e±ciency-improvement
e®ect while dampening the terms-of-trade e®ect. Thus, a unilateral monetary expansion can be
mutually bene¯cial regardless of the currencies of price setting.
There are two reasons why increased production interdependence magni¯es the e±ciency im-
provement e®ect of monetary expansions. First, with monopolistic distortions at each stage of
processing, there is a greater degree of production ine±ciency to be improved upon along a longer
processing chain. Second, with staggered price-setting at each stage, material costs and ¯rms'
marginal costs rise less in the home currency unit and, due to home currency devaluation, fall
more in the foreign currency unit at a more advanced processing stage. With a greater number of
processing stages, the rise in the home price level would thus become more sluggish and the fall in
the foreign price level become more pronounced, so that real aggregate demand and consumption
rise by more in both countries. Meanwhile, as production and trade move from less to more ad-
vanced processing stages, material inputs become increasingly cheaper than labor, and thus ¯rms
would have stronger incentives to substitute away from labor toward material inputs. In other
words, with more stages of production and trade, households can enjoy more consumption with-
out necessarily working harder, while the terms-of-trade e®ect becomes relatively less important,
leading to welfare improvements in both countries, regardless of the currencies of price setting.
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The welfare consequence of international monetary policy transmission has long concerned economists
and policymakers. In a world with international trade linkages for goods and assets, how a coun-
try's monetary policy surprises a®ect its own and trading partners' wellbeing is crucial to the
stability of the international monetary system. For instance, since the breakdown of the Bretton
Woods system, concerns over competitive devaluations have been an important topic in academic
writings and popular presses, and have motivated designs of international monetary institutions
and rules to prevent countries from adopting \beggar-thy-neighbor" policies or engaging in a
devaluation spiral. It is often argued that currency devaluation following a unilateral monetary
expansion may bene¯t the source country at the cost of trading partners.
Do countries' monetary policy expansions necessarily have negative international welfare spill-
over e®ects? In the earlier literature, discussions on such issues have usually been based upon
the classical Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model, which, however, is not built on explicit micro-
foundations and thus fails to provide a consistent welfare metric for policy analysis. Welfare
analysis in this literature typically rests upon ad-hoc objective functions.1
The new open-economy macroeconomic models pioneered by Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995) em-
phasize the roles of monopolistic distortions and nominal rigidities with explicit micro-foundations.
These models provide a sound theoretical apparatus that is apt at carrying out welfare analysis
| the utility function of a country's representative household serves as a natural measure for
the country's welfare. However, controversial welfare results have been obtained in this class of
models, depending on whether price contracts are set in sellers' or buyers' currency unit. While
a unilateral monetary expansion helps alleviate monopolistic distortions so as to raise output to
a more e±cient level in each country, it a®ects terms of trade in favor of one country and against
another depending on the currencies of price setting.
If prices are set in sellers' currency unit, then a unilateral monetary expansion weakens the
source (home) country's terms of trade, causing international expenditure switching to its goods.
The worsened terms of trade reduce the home country's purchasing power, and the expenditure
switching forces its households to work harder. Depending on parameter values, the e±ciency-
improvement e®ect may or may not outweigh the terms-of-trade e®ect, so that the home country's
welfare may rise [e.g., Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995)] or fall [e.g., Corsetti and Pesenti (2000)]. The
foreign country's welfare necessarily improves since both e®ects work to its favor. In contrast, if
prices are set in buyers' currency unit, then the home monetary expansion, while generating two
e®ects both in favor of the home country, worsens the foreign country's terms of trade, causing
6
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and its households have to work harder to meet the higher demand for its goods. Under plausible
parameter values, the terms-of-trade e®ect tends to dominate the e±ciency-improvement e®ect,
so the foreign's welfare falls [e.g., Betts and Devereux (2000)]. In other words, under buyers' local
currency pricing, monetary policy can be a beggar-thy-neighbor instrument.2
These controversial welfare results present an issue of concern for monetary policy making in an
increasingly globalized world economy. If sellers' local currency pricing behavior better captures
reality, then a country's attempt to close its domestic output gap through creating monetary
surprises may end up hurting itself since the improvement in production e±ciency can be more
than o®set by the deterioration of its terms of trade. The terms-of-trade consideration may thus
provide a useful commitment device to discourage a benevolent central bank from trying to create
surprise in°ation. By contrast, if buyers' local currency pricing is an empirically more relevant
phenomenon, then a country would be tempted to engineer surprise devaluations to close its own
output gap while \free-riding" on trading partners. This raises the possibility of \competitive
devaluation," a concern shared by the traditional Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model. Since in
reality both sellers' and buyers' local currency pricing behaviors are present [e.g., Obstfeld and
Rogo® (2000) and Goldberg and Knetter (1997)], any policy recommendations emanating from
this literature must be highly quali¯ed.
In this paper, we propose to resolve this controversy by incorporating an empirically relevant
feature into an otherwise standard new open-economy macroeconomic model. Speci¯cally, we
maintain that countries can trade not only ¯nished goods but also intermediate goods produced
at various stages of processing. Such a chain structure of production and trade has been of rising
importance in modern world trade [e.g., Feenstra (1998), Hummels, et al. (2001), and Yi (2003)],
and yet remarkably overlooked in the new open-economy macroeconomic literature. We show
that this increased world production interdependence magni¯es the e±ciency-improvement e®ect
while dampening the terms-of-trade e®ect. As a consequence, a unilateral monetary expansion
can be mutually bene¯cial and thus Pareto improving regardless of the currencies of price setting.
Production interdependence in the form of multiple stages of processing and trade magni¯es
the e±ciency-improvement e®ect for two reasons. First, with monopolistic distortions at each
stage of processing, there is a greater degree of production ine±ciency to be improved upon
along a longer processing chain. Second, given staggered price-setting, material costs and ¯rms'
marginal costs rise less in the home currency unit and (due to home currency devaluation) fall
more in the foreign currency unit at a more advanced processing stage. Thus ¯rms at a later
processing stage would raise their prices set in the home currency unit by less and lower their
7
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rise in the home price level becomes more sluggish and the fall in the foreign price level becomes
more pronounced, so that real aggregate demand and consumption rise by more in each country.
That said, to produce more consumption goods requires more labor along with more material
inputs, which seems to render the welfare e®ects potentially ambiguous. Such a concern is, how-
ever, not substantiated. As production and trade move from less to more advanced processing
stages, the patterns in the price adjustments across di®erent stages make material inputs increas-
ingly cheaper than labor, and ¯rms would have stronger incentives to substitute away from labor
toward material inputs. As a result, aggregate employment would not rise monotonically with the
number of processing stages. With a larger number of processing stages, households can enjoy
more consumption without necessarily working harder, while the terms-of-trade e®ect becomes
relatively less important. In consequence, the unilateral monetary expansion tends to bene¯t both
countries, regardless of whether prices are set in sellers' or buyers' local currency unit. In this
sense, international monetary policy transmission may not be a source of potential con°ict in a
world with increasing production interdependence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 illustrates
the controversy of the welfare results in the literature, based on a degenerate version of the model
with a single stage of processing. Section 4 presents the main results in the model with multiple
stages of production and trade and shows that it may help resolve the controversy. Section 5
concludes. We focus on explaining intuitions in the main text and relegate analytical results and
proofs to the Appendix.
2 A Model with Multiple Stages of Production and Trade
Consider a discrete-time, two-country world economy, with a home country and a foreign country.
Each country is populated by an in¯nitely-lived representative household. Each household derives
utility from consumption of ¯nished goods, real money balances, and leisure. Production of
consumption goods in each country needs to go through N ¸ 1 stages of processing. In particular,
production of ¯nished goods requires labor supplied by domestic households and intermediate
inputs supplied by domestic and foreign producers. Production of intermediate goods requires
labor and less processed intermediate inputs supplied by domestic and foreign ¯rms, and so on.
Production of raw materials requires only domestic labor input. At each processing stage, there
is a continuum of ¯rms indexed in the interval [0;1], each producing a di®erentiated good. Labor
market is perfectly competitive and goods markets are monopolistically competitive. Firms at each
8
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are tradable, labor is immobile across countries. The households have access to a complete set of
state-contingent nominal bonds denominated in the home currency unit.3 Figure 1 illustrates the
production and trading structure of this world economy.
2.1 Preferences and Technologies
Given the symmetry between the two countries, we focus on presenting the economic environment














where Ct denotes consumption, Mt= ¹ PNt denotes real money balances, Lt denotes labor supply,
¯ 2 (0;1) is a subjective discount factor, and E is an expectation operator. Note that the linearity
of the period utility function in labor hours is a consequence of aggregation when labor is assumed
to be indivisible and such a utility function is consistent with any labor supply elasticity at the
individual level.
The household faces a sequence of budget constraints
¹ PNtCt + EtDt;t+1Bt+1 + Mt · WtLt + ¦t + Bt + Mt¡1 + Tt; (2)
where Bt+1 is a state-contingent bond, Dt;t+1 is the price of the bond, Wt is the nominal wage
rate, and Tt is a lump-sum transfer from the domestic government.
The consumption good is a composite of ¯nal goods produced at stage N by domestic as well






























µ¡1 is a composite of imported ¯nal goods. The parameter µ measures
the elasticity of substitution between di®erentiated goods produced within a country; while ´
is the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in di®erent countries. Given µ and ´,
the parameter 1 ¡ ° determines the steady-state ratio of imports to domestic output. To ensure
existence of equilibrium under monopolistic competition, we assume that µ > 1.
The household maximizes utility subject to (2)-(3) and a borrowing constraint Bt ¸ ¡ ¹ B for
some large positive number ¹ B, for each t ¸ 0, with initial conditions M¡1 and B0 given. From
the ¯rst order conditions, we obtain demand functions for a type i ¯nished good produced in the
9
ECB


























1¡µ is a price index of stage-N goods produced and used in the




1¡µ a price index of stage-N goods made in the foreign
country and sold to the home country. The overall price level in the home country is an average










To produce a ¯nal good requires primary factors (i.e., labor in this model) and intermediate
goods produced at stage N ¡ 1 (by domestic as well as foreign producers); to produce a stage-
(N¡1) intermediate good requires primary factors and less-processed intermediate goods produced
at stage N ¡ 2; and so on. In general, the production function for a ¯rm i 2 [0;1] at stage
n 2 f2;:::;Ng is given by
Ynt(i) = ¹ Yn¡1;t(i)ÁLnt(i)1¡Á; (7)




























µ¡1. The output is ei-
ther sold in the home market or exported to the foreign market so that Yn(i) = YnH(i) + Y ¤
nH(i).
The production of raw materials at stage n = 1 requires only labor input, with a linear production
function given by Y1(i) = L1(i), where the output is either sold to the home market or exported
so that Y1(i) = Y1H(i) + Y ¤
1H(i).
2.2 Optimal Price-Setting Rules
Firms are as monopolistic competitors in output markets and price-takers in input markets. To
generate real e®ects of monetary policy shocks, we assume that, in each country, pricing decisions
at each processing stage are staggered. In particular, in each period, a fraction 1=2 of home
producers at a given stage n 2 f1;¢¢¢;Ng can adjust prices. Once a new price is set, it remains in
e®ect for 2 periods. We sort the indices of ¯rms at each stage so that those indexed by i 2 [0;1=2]
set prices in even periods of time and those indexed by i 2 (1=2;1] set prices in odd periods.
We consider the welfare implications of our model under two alternative pricing policies. In one
scenario, prices are rigid in sellers' local currency, so that changes in nominal exchange rate would
10
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exchange rate pass-through might be incomplete.
2.2.1 Sellers' Local Currency Pricing
We now derive the optimal pricing decisions when prices are set in sellers' local currency. In this
case, the law of one price (LOOP) holds not only for each individual type of goods, but also for
the composite goods produced at each stage. Denote by Et the nominal exchange rate (measured
by home currency units per unit of foreign currency). Then the LOOP implies that
¹ PnHt = Et ¹ P¤
nHt; ¹ PnFt = Et ¹ P¤
nFt; (8)
for all n 2 f1;:::;Ng, where ¹ PnHt and ¹ PnFt denote the home price indices of goods produced by
home ¯rms and by foreign ¯rms, respectively, and ¹ P¤
nHt and ¹ P¤
nFt are the corresponding foreign
price indices. It is worth noting that, since home goods and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes,
the purchasing power parity in general fails to hold, that is, ¹ Pnt 6= Et ¹ P¤
nt unless ° = 1=2, in which
case, there is no steady-state home-bias.
If a home ¯rm i 2 [0;1] at stage n 2 f1;:::;Ng can set a new price, it chooses a price PnHt(i)




Dt;¿[PnHt(i) ¡ Vn¿(i)]Y d
n¿(i); (9)
taking the unit cost function Vn¿(i) and the demand function Y d
n¿(i) = Y d
nH¿(i)+Y ¤d
nH¿(i) as given.
The unit cost for a ¯rm at stage 1 is simply the nominal wage rate since labor is the only
input at that stage. That is,
V1(t) ´ V1(i;t) = W(t): (10)
The unit cost for a ¯rm at stage n ¸ 2 is derived from minimizing the cost ¹ Pn¡1¹ Yn¡1 + WLn
subject to the production function (7), and is given by
Vn(t) ´ Vn(i;t) = ~ Á ¹ Pn¡1(t)ÁW(t)1¡Á; (11)
where ~ Á = Á¡Á(1 ¡ Á)¡(1¡Á) is a constant and ¹ Pn¡1(st) is the price index of all goods produced


















1¡µ are the price indices of home
goods and of imported goods, respectively.
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where n 2 f1;¢¢¢;N ¡ 1g. Equation (13) says that the demand for a type i good produced at
stage n will be higher if its price relative to the price index of all such goods is lower, if the price
index of these goods relative to the overall price index of stage-n goods is lower, or if the cost
of materials relative to the cost of labor is lower. The demand function in (14) can similarly be
interpreted.













where n 2 f1;:::;Ng. The pricing rule in (15) says that the optimal price set by a home ¯rm
is a constant markup over a weighted average of the ¯rm's two-period expected marginal costs.
The weights are normalized quantities of demand for its products in the corresponding periods.
Similarly, a foreign ¯rm who can set a new price will set its price, P¤
nFt(i), as a markup over a
weighted average of its current and expected future marginal costs.
2.2.2 Buyers' Local Currency Pricing
We now consider the case where ¯rms can price-discriminate markets in di®erent countries and
set prices in buyers' local currency. In this case, the law of one price in general does not hold.
When a home ¯rm i can set new prices, it chooses prices PnHt(i) for its products to be sold in
the home market, and P¤
nHt(i) for those to be exported, to maximize its two-period pro¯t, taking




Dt;¿f[PnHt(i) ¡ Vn¿(i)]Y d
nH¿(i) + [EtP¤
nHt(i) ¡ Vn¿(i)]Y ¤d
nH¿(i)g; (16)
where Y d
nH(i) is the domestic demand for the ¯rm's product given by (13), and Y ¤d
nH(i) is the
foreign's demand for the ¯rm's product, given by the foreign counterpart of (14).


























where n 2 f1;:::;Ng. The optimal pricing decisions by ¯rms in the foreign country (i.e., the
choices of P¤
nFt(i) and PnFt(i)) can similarly be derived.
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The monetary authority in each country injects newly created money through lump-sum transfers
to the representative domestic household, so that




The stocks of money supply grow according to Mt = ¹tMt¡1 and M¤
t = ¹¤
tM¤
t¡1, where the money
growth rates ¹t and ¹¤
t follow stationary stochastic processes.












market clearing implies that Bt + B¤
t = 0.
An equilibrium for this economy is a collection of allocations and prices such that (i) taking
wages and prices as given, each household's allocations solve its utility maximization problem; (ii)
taking wages and all prices but its own as given, each ¯rm's allocations and prices solve its pro¯t-
maximization problem; (iii) markets for labor, money, and bonds clear; (iv) monetary policies are
as speci¯ed.
In what follows, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all ¯rms in a given price-setting
cohort make identical pricing decisions. In such an equilibrium, ¯rms are identi¯ed by the country
in which they operate, the stage on which they produce, and the time at which they can change
prices. Thus, from now on, we drop the individual ¯rm index i, and denote by, for example, PnH(t)
the price set for the home market by a ¯rm that operates in the home country, produces on stage
n, and gets the chance to change its price at time t. We log-linearize the equilibrium conditions
around a balanced-trade steady state and use lowercase letters to denote log-linearized variables.
The log-linearized equilibrium conditions under sellers' local currency pricing (SLCP) and under
buyers' local currency pricing (BLCP) are summarized in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Since we
are interested in the welfare consequence of international monetary policy interdependence, we
shall focus on a perfect foresight equilibrium following a unilateral monetary expansion.
3 Single Stage of Processing: Ambiguous Welfare Results
In this section, we explain why the welfare consequence of a unilateral monetary expansion can
be ambiguous when all production and trade occur at a single stage. This case corresponds to
N = 1 in our model.
Consider a unilateral monetary policy expansion in the home country so that mt = 1 and
m¤
t = 0 for all t. We show in the Appendix that, following such a shock, home currency depreciates
fully (i.e., et = 1 for all t), the nominal wage rate rises immediately in the home country but is
13
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t = 0 for all t), and nominal aggregate demand
rises fully in the home country but remains unchanged in the foreign country (i.e., ¹ pNt + ct = 1
and ¹ p¤
Nt + c¤
t = 0). These results obtain regardless of how many processing stages there are or in
which currency prices are rigid, since they are derived from the households' optimizing behaviors.
Yet, the real e®ects of money and therefore the welfare implications of the monetary expansion
do depend on the number of processing stages and the currencies of price-setting.
3.1 Welfare Implications of Sellers' Local Currency Pricing (SLCP)
We ¯rst examine the case with sellers' local currency pricing. In this case, the optimal pricing
equations in Table 1 imply that the adjustment of the prices set by home ¯rms, p1Ht, and by
foreign ¯rms, p¤
1Ft, are determined by the ¯rms' marginal costs, which coincide with the domestic
nominal wage rates. Given the patterns of nominal wage adjustments, home ¯rms that can adjust
prices will raise their prices fully, while foreign ¯rms would choose to keep their prices unchanged
(i.e., p1Ht = 1 and p¤
1Ft = 0 for all t). Since half of the ¯rms in each country cannot adjust prices,
the price index of home produced goods does not rise fully until the end of the contract duration,
and the price index of foreign made goods remains at the steady-state level. In particular, we
have ¹ p1H0 = 1=2, ¹ p1Ht = 1 for t ¸ 1, and ¹ p¤
1Ft = 0 for all t ¸ 0.
Despite the unchanged price of foreign goods in the foreign currency unit, the price of imported
goods facing the home household increases due to the home currency depreciation. The home
price level thus rises, but does not rise fully until the end of the contract duration because of
staggered pricing-setting. The foreign household faces a lowered price index of imported goods in
the impact period since the prices of these goods are only partially adjusted in the home currency
unit and the adjustment does not catch up with the home currency depreciation until the end of
the contract duration. Given that the price index of foreign produced goods remains unchanged,
the fall in the import price index in the foreign currency unit implies that the foreign price level
has to fall.
Since nominal aggregate demand in the home country rises fully, while the price level rises only
partially in the impact period, home consumption rises in that period, so do home real money
balances. In particular, the price adjustment patterns imply that c0 = °=2 and ct = 0 for all
t ¸ 1. In the foreign country, nominal aggregate demand remains unchanged while the price level
falls in the impact period, so that consumption and real money balances rise on impact. It is easy
to show that c¤
0 = (1 ¡ °)=2 and c¤
t = 0 for all t ¸ 1. Thus, the home monetary expansion tends
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sumption and real balances, but also on labor e®ort. To obtain the responses of labor e®ort, we
¯rst integrate the demand for labor [i.e., L1(i) = Y1(i) and L¤
1(i) = Y ¤
1 (i)] across ¯rms within
a country, and then use the goods demand functions (4)-(5) and their foreign counterparts (for
N = 1) to relate each country's employment to world consumption and its own terms of trade.
Speci¯cally, the log-linearized employment under SLCP are given by
lt = ¡2´°(1 ¡ °)¿1t + °ct + (1 ¡ °)c¤
t; (20)
l¤
t = ¡2´°(1 ¡ °)¿¤
1t + °c¤
t + (1 ¡ °)ct; (21)
where ¿1t = ¹ p1Ht ¡ ¹ p¤
1Ft ¡ et denotes the home country's terms of trade, and ¿¤
1t = ¡¿1t is the
foreign counterpart. It follows that a country's employment decreases with its terms of trade. As
its terms of trade improve, a country's real purchasing power increases and the world demand for
its products falls (through an expenditure-switching e®ect) so that its household could work less
hard to support the same consumption allocation. For this reason, an improvement in a country's
terms of trade tends to improve its welfare.
Following the home country's monetary expansion, the home currency depreciates, and under
SLCP, its terms of trade are worsened. Speci¯cally, the adjustments of nominal exchange rate
and prices in the two countries imply that ¿10 = ¡1=2 and ¿1t = 0 for all t ¸ 1, which is to say
that the home country's terms of trade are worsened until the end of the contract duration. This
contributes to increasing the labor e®ort of the home household and reducing the e®ort of the
foreign household. Thus, the terms-of-trade variation can potentially generate a \beggar-thy-self"
e®ect, as emphasized by Corsetti and Pesenti (2000).
To make the welfare analysis more explicit, we de¯ne the welfare in a country as the present
value of the life-time utility of its representative household. In the spirit of Lucas (1987), Cooley
and Hansen (1989), and Betts and Devereux (2000), we use a consumption-equivalence measure as
a welfare metric and we gauge the welfare gain in each country from the home monetary expansion
by the percentage increase in its representative household's steady-state consumption that would
make the household indi®erent between the cases with and without the expansion. Speci¯cally,
the welfare gain in the home country is given by the percentage change in the home household's

























where the variables with time-subscripts denote the equilibrium values in the presence of the
monetary expansion, and those without the subscripts denote the corresponding steady-state
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ln(1 + ¢) = (1 ¡ ¯)
1 X
t=0
¯t [(1 + ª)ct ¡ ·Ll(t)]; (23)
The welfare gain in the foreign country is similarly computed.
In the special case with N = 1, we have ·L = 1=¹, where ¹ = µ=(µ ¡ 1) denotes the steady-
state markup of price over marginal cost. Using the solutions of consumption, real balances, and
labor e®orts, we obtain closed-form expressions for the two countries' welfare gains as




°(1 + ª) ¡
1
¹
(1 + 2(´ ¡ 1)°(1 ¡ °)
¸
; (24)
ln(1 + ¢¤) =
1 ¡ ¯
2
[(1 ¡ °)(1 + ª) + 2(´ ¡ 1)°(1 ¡ °)=¹]; (25)
Thus, given that 0 < ¯ < 1, whether a country is better o® or worse o® depends on the parameters
´, the elasticity of substitution between home goods and foreign goods; °, the steady-state share
of domestically produced goods in total output (so that 1 ¡ ° measures the degree of openness);
and ¹, the steady-state markup by monopolistically competitive ¯rms within each country.5
In light of (25), it is theoretically possible for the home monetary expansion to reduce the
foreign country's welfare (for example, when ° is close to one and ´ close to zero). Yet, under
empirically plausible parameter values, in particular, with ´ ¸ 1 [e.g., Backus, et al. (1995)], the
foreign country tends to gain from the home monetary expansion. In contrast, as in light of (24),
the monetary expansion can reduce the home country's welfare for reasonable parameter values.
For example, given ´ ¸ 1, home welfare falls if ° · 1=¹. Thus, the monetary expansion may
have a \beggar-thy-self" e®ect for small values of ° and ¹. Further, a larger value of ´ also tends
to reduce the welfare. These results conform to the ¯nding by Corsetti and Pesenti (2000), who
assume a value of ´ equal to 1.6
The reason why the home monetary expansion may have a \beggar-thy-self" e®ect under SLCP
is that, although the expansion raises home consumption and real money balances, it also leads to
home currency depreciation and terms-of-trade deterioration, the latter of which tends to reduce
its real purchasing power and to force its household to work harder to meet the increased world
demand for its products. While the increased consumption and real money balances tend to raise
the country's welfare, the increased labor e®orts tend to reduce it. The fall in welfare becomes
more likely, the larger the steady-state degree of openness (measured by 1 ¡ °), the smaller the
home ¯rms' monopoly power (measured by ¹), or the greater the elasticity of substitution between
home goods and foreign goods (measured by ´). The foreign country gains as long as ´ ¸ 1 since
the home monetary expansion not only raises foreign consumption and real money balances, it
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resulting in lowered demand for foreign labor e®ort.
3.2 Welfare Implications of Buyers' Local Currency Pricing (BLCP)
Under buyers' local currency pricing, a ¯rm can charge di®erent prices for its products sold in
di®erent countries. For the products to be sold in the domestic markets, ¯rms' pricing decisions
under BLCP are similar to those under SLCP. In particular, since the nominal wage rate in
the home country rises fully following its monetary expansion, while foreign's nominal wage rate
remains unchanged, home ¯rms will accordingly raise the prices of their products to be sold in
the home market while foreign ¯rms will keep unchanged the prices of their products to be sold in
the foreign market. For the products to be exported, however, the pricing decisions will depend
on the exchange-rate adjusted marginal costs. With the home currency depreciation, ¯rms in the
two countries face an increased marginal cost in the home currency unit but unchanged marginal
cost in the foreign currency unit. Thus, home ¯rms would choose to keep unchanged the prices
of their products to be exported, while foreign ¯rms would choose to raise the prices of their
products to be sold in the home market.
These price adjustment patterns, when coupled with staggered pricing decisions, imply that
the home price level does not rise fully until the end of the contract duration, while the foreign
price level remains unchanged all the time. Thus, home consumption and real money balances
rise on impact and fall back to the steady state afterwards, while foreign consumption and real
balances remain unchanged. Speci¯cally, it is easy to show that, under BLCP, the responses of
consumption during the impact period are c0 = 1=2 and c¤
0 = 0; and the responses of employment
are l0 = °=2 and l¤
0 = (1 ¡ °)=2. All real variables return to the steady state from period 1
onward. It follows that the two countries's welfare gains under BLCP are given by

















Clearly, with reasonable parameter values, the unilateral monetary expansion in the home country
unambiguously raises its own welfare at the expense of the foreign country's and it is therefore a
\beggar-thy-neighbor" instrument.
To understand this result, we note that, following the home country's monetary expansion,
the foreign household faces worsened terms of trade. In particular, the foreign's terms of trade
are given by ¿¤
t = ¹ p1Ft¡ ¹ p¤
1Ht¡et. Since the foreign's import price index ¹ p¤
1Ht remains unchanged
and the rise in the export price index ¹ p1Ft does not fully catch up with the home currency
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The loss in the foreign country's real purchasing power o®sets the gain in its labor income, so that
its consumption remains unchanged. With unchanged consumption and increased labor e®ort,
the foreign country's welfare falls. In contrast, the home country's welfare improves since the
terms of trade work to its favor so that its household can a®ord to consume more without having
to work too much harder.
3.3 Currencies of Price-Setting: Ambiguous Welfare Implications
The previous two subsections have illustrated that, if all production and trade occur at a single
stage, then the welfare implications of a country's unilateral monetary expansion under sellers'
local currency pricing are generally di®erent from those under buyers' local currency pricing. Such
di®erence is often an important source of the debate on issues such as \competitive devaluation."
If sellers' local currency pricing better captures reality, then the model suggests that a country's
attempt to close its domestic output gap through creating a unilateral monetary surprise may
end up hurting its own welfare since the improvement in its production e±ciency can be more
than o®set by the deterioration in its terms of trade. The terms-of-trade consideration may thus
provide a useful commitment device to discourage a benevolent central bank from trying to create
surprise in°ation. By contrast, if buyers' local currency pricing is empirically more relevant,
then a country would be tempted to engineer surprise devaluation to close its own output gap
while \free-riding" on trading partners. This raises the possibility of \competitive devaluation,"
a concern shared by the traditional Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model.
Thus, were we to view the model with a single stage of processing and trade as an appropriate
theoretical framework for welfare analysis in an open economy, the issue would boil down to an
empirical question: Are price contracts set primarily in sellers' local currency or in buyers' local
currency? As we have mentioned in the Introduction, the existing studies reveal that both types
of local currency pricing are empirically signi¯cant phenomena. This suggests that whether a
country's attempt to devalue its currency will have a \beggar-thy-self" or \beggar-thy-neighbor"
e®ect may be rather ambiguous. However, as we will demonstrate below, when production and
trade need to go through multiple stages, such ambiguity disappears.
4 Multiple Stages of Processing: Resolving the Ambiguity
As we have alluded to in the Introduction, one characteristic of modern globalization is the growing
importance of international trade along a vertical chain with multiple stages of production. Such
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e®ects of monetary shocks, and as such, it may help resolve the ambiguity in the welfare results
under di®erent assumptions on the currencies of price-setting. We turn now to showing that this
is indeed the case.
4.1 Some Intuitions
We start by providing some intuitions behind the transmission mechanism embodied in the pro-
duction and trading chain. Our central idea is that, as production and trade are stretched over a
larger number of processing stages, the home price level will rise by less while the foreign price level
will fall by more, and over a longer period of time, resulting in a greater increase in real aggregate
demand in both countries following the home monetary expansion. These patterns emerge in the
adjustment of the price level and the response of real aggregate demand regardless of in which
currency price contracts are set. With a reasonable number of processing stages, the increase in
real aggregate demand and thus in production e±ciency can overwhelm the terms-of-trade e®ect,
leading to a welfare improvement in both countries.
The key to understanding the pattern in the adjustment of the price level is to understand how
marginal costs at di®erent stages of processing would respond to the home monetary expansion.
We now discuss the intuitions for the marginal cost movements.
4.1.1 Sellers' local currency pricing
Consider ¯rst the case with sellers' local currency pricing and with multiple stages of production
and trade. When there are two stages of processing, the marginal costs facing ¯rms at the second
stage are partially determined by the price index of all goods produced and traded at the ¯rst
stage. In the impact period, as explained in Section 3:1, the price index of stage-one goods
partially rises in the home country and falls in the foreign country, so do the marginal costs facing
¯rms at the second stage. Thus, those stage-two ¯rms that can set new prices would choose to
partially raise their prices in the home country and lower their prices in the foreign country. With
staggered price-setting, the price index of stage-two goods (including both domestically produced
and imported) must rise by less in the home country and fall by more in the foreign country than
does the price index of stage-one goods. Further, the incomplete adjustment in the price indexes
of stage-two goods will persist for one more period than the price indexes of stage-one goods.
When there are three or more stages of processing, the same logic implies that the price index
of goods at a more advanced processing stage has to rise by less in the home country and fall by
more in the foreign country, and the incomplete adjustment of the price indexes would persist for
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processing stage. Thus, the price level rises by less in the home country and falls by more in the
foreign country and becomes more persistent in both countries as the number of processing stages
grows larger.
4.1.2 Buyers' local currency pricing
Under buyers' local currency pricing, ¯rms can set di®erent prices for the products to be sold
in di®erent countries, so that when ¯rms set prices for their goods to be exported, the relevant
marginal costs need to be adjusted for currency units. At the ¯rst processing stage, the marginal
cost is given by the domestic nominal wage rate, which rises fully in the home country. Thus, the
marginal cost faced by home ¯rms rises in the home currency unit, but remains unchanged in the
foreign currency unit because of the home currency depreciation. Home ¯rms would thus keep the
prices of exported goods unchanged. Meanwhile, foreign ¯rms face an unchanged nominal wage
rate in the foreign currency unit so that they choose not to adjust the prices of goods to be sold
in the domestic market. It follows that there will be no change in the price index of stage-one
goods sold in the foreign market.
The unchanged stage-one foreign price index implies that foreign ¯rms at the second stage face
unchanged marginal costs and thus would choose to stay put even if they can set new prices. Yet,
the price index of stage-two goods imported from the home country falls in the foreign currency
unit since home ¯rms at the second stage faces a partially adjusted marginal cost in the home
currency unit and, given the home currency depreciation, a lowered marginal cost in the foreign
currency unit. The unchanged prices of foreign's domestically produced goods and the lowered
prices of its imported goods imply that the foreign price index of stage-two goods has to fall. As a
consequence, foreign ¯rms at the third processing stage face a lowered marginal cost and therefore
would choose to lower their prices as well. This, when coupled with the lowered prices of goods
imported from the home country, implies that the foreign price index of stage-three goods must
fall by even more and for a longer period of time than the stage-two price index, and so on.
4.2 Some Analytical Results
The patterns of price adjustments described above are formally established in the Appendix.
Speci¯cally, we show that, following the home monetary expansion, the rise in the home price
level becomes more gradual, the fall in the foreign price level becomes more pronounced, and
both become more persistent as the production and trading chain grows longer, and these price
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pendix]. It follows that, with more stages of processing and trade, the real e®ect of the monetary
expansion becomes larger and more persistent in both countries. Denote by yNt the response to
the home monetary expansion of real aggregate demand (i.e., consumption in the current model)
in the home country and by y¤
Nt the foreign counterpart when there are N stages of processing.
The following proposition formally establish the monotonic relation between N and the responses
of the real aggregate demand.
Proposition 1: In a perfect foresight equilibrium, the following inequalities hold for all N ¸ 1,
regardless of the currency unit at which prices are set:
yN+1;t > yNt; y¤
N+1;t > y¤
Nt; 0 · t · N: (28)
Proof: (see the Appendix)
4.3 Some Calibrated Results
The increase in real aggregate demand and hence in consumption as N rises tends to improve
welfare in both countries. But if the rise in N were also associated with large increases in labor
demand, as labor is an input of production at all stages, the overall welfare e®ect would seem
to remain ambiguous. However, as it turns out, this concern needs not be substantiated. As we
have explained earlier, the prices of goods at a more advanced processing stage rise less in the
home country and fall more in the foreign country, while the nominal wage rate rises fully in the
home country and remains unchanged in the foreign country. Thus, at a more advanced stage,
labor becomes more expensive relative to intermediate inputs, so that ¯rms would have a greater
incentive to substitute intermediate inputs for labor inputs. For this reason, changes in aggregate
employment in each country need not be monotone in N. In other words, a greater number of
processing stages would allow for more consumption goods to be produced in both countries with
a given amount of labor input, since ¯rms would rely on using more goods to produce goods.
This, when coupled with the monotonic relationship between changes in consumption and in N,
makes it more likely for the monetary expansion to bene¯t both countries.
Now, what about the terms-of-trade e®ect? This e®ect tends to bene¯t one country at the
expense of the other, and which country would indeed bene¯t from it depends on in which currency
price contracts are set. In the special case with N = 1, as we have shown in Section 3, the terms-of-
trade e®ect tends to dominate the e±ciency improvement e®ect so that the international welfare
implications of the home monetary expansion depend on assumptions about the currencies of
price-setting. With a reasonable number of processing stages, however, the e±ciency improvement
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plausible parameter values, the home monetary expansion improves the welfare of both countries,
regardless of whether price contracts are set in sellers' or buyers' local currency.
The remaining question is: How large is the number of processing stages required to generate
welfare improvements in both countries following the home monetary expansion? To answer this
question, we ¯rst calibrate the model's parameters, except for N, which we would treat as a free
parameter. We then compute the impulse responses of consumption and labor e®orts following
the expansion. Finally, we compute the welfare gain, as given by (23), and we plot it against N.
Details of the computation methods are available upon request from the authors.
We calibrate the parameters following the standard international business cycle literature. We
consider one period in the model as corresponding to one half of a year, so that there is a minimum
amount of exogenous nominal price staggering. Accordingly, the duration of each price contract
is equal to one year, as is consistent with the empirical evidence surveyed by Taylor (1999). We
set ¯, the subjective discount factor, to 0:98, so that the annual real interest rate in the steady
state is about 4 percent. We assume a zero steady-state in°ation rate, so the money demand
equation implies that ª = (1 ¡ ¯)=v, where v = ¹ PNC=M is the steady-state velocity of money.
Given the value of ¯, we set ª = 0:0084, corresponding to a steady-state annual velocity of 4:8.7
The parameter · by itself is unimportant since what a®ects the equilibrium dynamics and the










where L is the steady-state employment. We set µ, the elasticity of substitution between goods
produced within a country, to 7, so that the steady-state markup [¹ ´ µ=(µ ¡ 1)] at each processing
stage is about 17 percent, which lies in an empirically reasonable range [e.g., Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997)]. It is easy to show that the steady-state employment ·L is a decreasing function
of N. The larger N is, the greater is the cumulative markup across stages, and the further lies
output below the e±ciency frontier, and thus the greater is the room for e±ciency improvement.
We next set ´, the elasticity of substitution between goods made in di®erent countries, to 1:5;
and °, the steady-state share of domestically produced goods in GDP, to 0:85. These values are
standard in the literature [e.g., Backus, et al. (1995)]. Finally, we set Á = 0:9, so that as N varies
from 2 to 6, the share of total intermediate goods in gross sales across all stages of processing lies
in the range between 0:43 and 0:71.8
Figures 2 and 3 plot the impulse responses of consumption and aggregate employment in the
two countries under the calibrated parameters and for various N, when prices are set in sellers'
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and the implications of our analytical results that the responses of real aggregate demand increase
with N, while the responses of aggregate employment need not be monotonic in N due to the factor
substitution e®ect. It is especially worth noting that, under sellers' local currency pricing, foreign
aggregate employment falls because of its improved terms of trade. The fall in foreign employment
is more pronounced, the larger is the number of processing stages, because, as production moves
to a more advanced stage, ¯rms would have a stronger incentive to substitute intermediate inputs
for labor.
Figure 4 plots the responses of the home country's terms of trade under the two alternative
currencies of price-setting. As N increases, the deterioration in the terms of trade under sellers'
local currency pricing tends to be dampened, while the improvement in the terms of trade under
buyers' local currency pricing tends to be reduced on impact and even reversed in the subsequent
periods.
Since changes in consumption in the two countries increase with N while changes in em-
ployment need not, the welfare in both countries is an increasing function of N. Since the
terms-of-trade movement tends to be dampened as the number of stages increases, the welfare
gains in the two countries tend to become less dependent on the currencies of price-setting. The
welfare gains in the calibrated model are plotted in Figures 5 and 6. If prices are rigid in sell-
ers' currency [Figure 5], the home monetary expansion has a \beggar-thy-self" e®ect when there
is a single stage of processing; yet, when N rises above 3, both countries experience a welfare
gain. If prices are rigid in buyers' currency [Figure 6], the monetary expansion is a \beggar-thy-
neighbor" instrument for small values of N; but when N rises above 5, both countries gain from
the expansion.
5 Conclusion
In their seminal work, Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995) envisioned that a monetary expansion, regard-
less of its source, could lead to a \general increase in world demand ..., and both countries share
the bene¯ts equally" [p. 647]. Based on this result, they dismissed the fear of competitive devalua-
tion, a caution often cast by the conventional Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch models, as misleading.
They wrote that \the earlier models may overstate the importance of the `beggar-thy-neighbor'
e®ects that a country in°icts on trading partners when it depreciates its currency" [p. 648]. Such
optimism has stimulated a voluminous strand of literature [see Lane (2001) for a survey], with
mixed and often ambiguous predictions on the international welfare e®ects of a country's currency
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depend largely on the currencies at which prices are rigid.
We have re-examined this hypothesis by incorporating a production and trading chain, a
feature of rising empirical importance, into an otherwise standard new open-economy macroeco-
nomic model in the spirit of Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995). We have shown that the ambiguity in
the welfare e®ects documented in the literature may disappear with plausibly sophisticated input
and output connections between countries: with a reasonable number of stages along the produc-
tion and trading chain, a country's currency devaluation can lead to a welfare improvement for
both itself and its trading partner, regardless of the currencies of price-setting. In this sense, our
theory provides support for Obstfeld and Rogo®'s original optimism in a world with production
interdependence.
Appendix: Proofs
We ¯rst establish several preliminary results, which will serve as intermediate steps to the proof
of Proposition 1. We ¯rst have
Lemma 1: There is a unique perfect foresight equilibrium in which
wt = 1; w¤
t = 0; 8t ¸ 0; (29)
et = 1; 8t ¸ 0; (30)
¹ pnt = 1; ¹ p¤
nt = 0; 8t ¸ n; 1 · n · N; (31)
yNt = 0; y¤
Nt = 0; 8t ¸ N: (32)
for all N ¸ 1. These results hold independent of the currency in which prices are rigid. Further,
if prices are set in sellers' local currency, then
pnHt = 1; p¤
nFt = 0; 8t ¸ n ¡ 1; 1 · n · N; (33)
while if prices are set in buyers' local currency, then
pnHt = 1; pnFt = 1; p¤
nFt = 0; p¤
nHt = 0; (34)
8t ¸ n ¡ 1; 1 · n · N:
Proof: According to the home money demand equations (S6) or (B6) (in Tables 1 and 2),
existence of a non-explosive solution to the equilibrium system requires that
¹ pNt + yNt = mt = 1; ¹ p¤
Nt + y¤
Nt = m¤
t = 0; (35)
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forward, we obtain (30) . Given (29) and (30), the equations in (33), (34), and (31) can then be
proved by induction, using (S1)-(S4) and (B1)-(B4). Finally, given that (31) holds also for N,
(32) follows immediately from (35). Q.E.D.
This Lemma shows that the home monetary expansion immediately raises its nominal wage
rate, but has no e®ect on the foreign nominal wage rate. It also leads to a complete home nominal
exchange rate depreciation. After n periods following the shock, the price index of stage-n goods
in the home country will rise fully and the price index of stage-n goods in the foreign country will
return to the steady state. After N periods, the real e®ects of the shock vanishes and aggregate
demands in both countries return to the steady state.
The next Lemma establishes the patterns of price adjustments across di®erent stages of pro-
cessing under the two alternative assumptions about the currencies in which prices are rigid.
Lemma 2: Suppose N ¸ 2. If prices are set in sellers' local currency, then the following
inequalities about pricing decisions hold for n 2 f1;:::;N ¡ 1g:
0 < pn+1;Ht < pnHt; p¤
n+1;Ft < p¤
nFt · 0; 0 · t · n ¡ 1; (36)
On the other hand, if prices are set in buyers' local currency, then the following inequalities about
pricing decisions hold for n 2 f1;:::;N ¡ 1g:
0 < pn+1;Ht < pnHt; p¤
n+1;Ft · p¤
nFt · 0; 0 · t · n ¡ 1; (37)
p¤
n+1;Ht < p¤
nHt · 0; 0 < pn+1;Ft · pnFt; 0 · t · n ¡ 1; (38)
Under either sellers' or buyers' local currency pricing, the following inequalities about price indices
hold for n 2 f1;:::;N ¡ 1g:
0 < ¹ pn+1;t < ¹ pnt; ¹ p¤
n+1;t < ¹ p¤
nt · 0; 0 · t · n: (39)
Proof: To prove (36), we ¯rst use (S1)-(S4), along with the solutions wt = 1 and w¤
t = 0
for nominal wages and et = 1 for the nominal exchange rate in (29) and (30), to get a recursive










n+1;F;t¡1 + (1 ¡ a)p¤












[pn+1;Ht + apn+1;H;t¡1 + (1 ¡ a)pn+1;H;t+1] ¡ Á(1 ¡ °);; (41)
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in (36) hold for n = 1. This establishes the result for N = 2. Now suppose that N > 2 and the
inequalities hold for an arbitrary n 2 f1;:::;N ¡ 2g. Fix an arbitrary t with 0 · t · n. By the
induction hypothesis and (33), we have
pn+1;Ht · pnHt; pn+1;H;t¡1 · pnH;t¡1; pn+1;H;t+1 · pnH;t+1;








with at least one strict inequality if and only if n > 1. Thus, from the recursive relations in (40)
and (41), we have pn+2;Ht < pn+1;Ht and p¤
n+2;Ft < p¤
n+1;Ft. This completes the proof of (36).
The proof of (37) and (38) is similar. In particular, note that (B1), (B2), and the solutions
for nominal wage rate and the nominal exchange rate together imply that
p¤
nHt = pnHt ¡ 1; pnFt = p¤
nFt + 1: (42)
Thus, (38) will be an immediate corollary if we can establish (37). To prove (37), we follow a












n+1;F;t¡1 + (1 ¡ a)p¤












[pn+1;Ht + apn+1;H;t¡1 + (1 ¡ a)pn+1;H;t+1];; (44)
Then, the inequalities in (37) can be proved by induction.
Finally, the inequalities in (39) follow from the de¯nitions of the price indices in (S4) or (B4),
and the inequalities in (36) or (37)-(38). Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 shows that the home monetary expansion leads to a rise in the home prices at each
processing stage but a fall in the foreign prices. Further, at a more advanced processing stage,
the rise in the home prices becomes more gradual and the fall in the foreign prices becomes more
pronounced, and the movements in the prices become more persistent.
It follows that, as the number of stages increases, the home price level will rise more gradually
and the foreign price level will fall by a greater magnitude. Given the money supply process in the
two countries, the price adjustment patterns imply that real aggregate demands in both countries
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is essentially the result in Proposition 1 in the text.
Proof of Proposition 1: It follows immediately from (35) and (39). Q.E.D.
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1. Obstfeld (2001) provides a useful survey of the postwar analytical thinking on international
macroeconomics, and assesses the in°uence of Mundell and Fleming's work and the recent progress
in the ¯eld.
2. In addition to the work cited above, there is a growing body of literature examining the
international welfare e®ects of monetary policy shocks in a new open-economy macroeconomic
model, some assuming sellers' local currency pricing, while some others assuming buyers' local
currency pricing. For example, Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000) study the e®ect of exchange-
rate systems on trade and welfare in a model with buyers' currency pricing; Devereux and Engel
(1998) analyze the welfare properties of ¯xed and °oating exchange rate regimes and ¯nd that
the optimal exchange rate regime depend on whether prices are set in the currency of producers
or the currency of consumers.
3. This assumption implies that monetary shocks have no permanent e®ect on current account
balances. This helps simplify the welfare analysis. See, also, Devereux and Engel (1998, 1999)
and Chari, et al. (2002).
4. As in Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995), our model features monopolistic competition that creates
a ¯rst-order distortion, the e®ect of which on welfare would dominate that of any higher-order
distortions for small shocks. Thus, as in Obstfeld and Rogo®, it is su±cient for our welfare analysis
to examine the ¯rst-order approximation of the perfect-foresight equilibrium system following a
small, one-time shock. We are grateful to Chris Sims for pointing this out to us and for very
useful discussions on related subjects.
5. The parameter ª measures the importance of real money balances in the utility function,
and its value is typically small in light of most money demand regressions [e.g., Chari, et al.
(2000)].
6. Corsetti and Pesenti (2000) also assume that the two countries may have di®erent degrees
of steady-state home-bias (i.e., the °'s may di®er across countries).
7. Here we use M1 as a measure of money supply to compute the velocity. The welfare results
are not sensitive to the use of M2 or monetary base instead.
8. Let © denote the share of total intermediate goods in gross sales across all stages. Since
the steady-state aggregate value added is given by ¹ PNYN, we have 1¡© = ¹ PNYN=
PN
n=1 ¹ PnYn =
1¡Á=¹
1¡(Á=¹)N . From the BEA's 1997 Benchmark Input-Output Tables, the value of © is about 0:7 in
the U.S. manufacturing sector.
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  Figure 1: ---The international production and trading structure 
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Periods after shock: half−years







Figure 2:—The impulse responses of consumption and employment under
sellers’ local currency pricing.
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Figure 3:—The impulse responses of consumption and employment under
buyers’ local currency pricing.
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Figure 4:—The impulse responses of the home country’s terms of trade.
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Figure 5:—Welfare gains under sellers’ local currency pricing.
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Figure 6:—Welfare gains under buyers’ local currency pricing.
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